What is a CRSP?

New terms come into vogue all the time. Sometimes this is done with good reason, and other times it is not. Every now and then an older term will be dusted off and used to describe a new tactic, technique or procedure.

Last year, I started hearing the term, CRSP (pronounced "crisp"), getting tossed around. This set off an alarm in my head, since I am very familiar with most logistics terms and TTPs. I assumed it was new, and I starting searching for more information.

As it turned out, my old boss at CASCOM set me straight. CRSP is not a new term. If fact, it has been around for quite some time (at least 1997).

The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (short title: Joint Pub 1-02 or JP 1-02) defines a CRSP as follows:

"centralized receiving and shipping point — Actual location where containers with cargo must be sorted before transshipment to the appropriate supply support activity or owning unit. Single consignee cargo and ammunition will not pass through the centralized receiving and shipping point. Cargo will be shipped directly to the owner with the movement organization maintaining visibility, and ammunition will go directly to the appropriate ammunition storage facility. Also called CRSP. (JP 4-01.7)"

JP 4-01.7 is Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations.

I consulted the deputy SPO of 15th Sustainment Brigade. This is what he sent me (my comments in italics):

"The CRSP is used as a centralized pick and drop off point for all CLPs [combat logistics patrols]. The 15th SB SPO Transportaiton OIC, manages the Taji and VBC CRSP yards and they are operated by subordinate Battalions in the Brigade. The CRSP Yard provides a central location for Transportation assets [to] transfer cargo for onward movement and delivery to [a] unit. The CRSP Yard decreases shipment time for most cargo and reduces the number of transportation assets on the road. Transportation Movement Requests (TMR) [actually transportation movement releases, FM 4-01.30] are used to move any piece of cargo in theater as well as RFID tags. The Empty Container Collection Point (ECCP is also co-located in the CRSP. As stated below, it is not only containers but all cargo (containers, pallets, skids, CL VII, IX, IV). CL I, IIIB, and V, do not go to the CRSP but go to the ASP and CL I point respectively."

While consistent with JP 1-02, this interpretation isn't a perfect match. The joint definition really points to a single point in an area of operations (hence "central"), but the usage above describes multiple points.

I'd humbly suggest identifying a single CRSP and referring to other locations where these functions are performed as area distribution centers or perhaps just RSPs (receiving and shipping points). Or would this in effect be creating new terminology unnecessarily?

More about the FSC

Here's a draft excerpt from a paper I'm working on addressing FSC command relationships in the BCT. My thinking has changed over time on how all of this should work, but I firmly believe that direct support is out of the question in most cases, especially high intensity combat.

SUBJECT: Forward Support Company Command Relationships in the Brigade Combat Team

Purpose. To provide information about command relationships as they pertain to the forward support company (FSC) in the brigade combat team (BCT).

Background. The FSC was originally designed to be organic to a combat arms battalion (CAB). As such, each FSC in the BCT has capabilities specifically tailored for the battalion it was designed to support (maneuver, fires, cavalry, etc.) As an organic unit of a CAB, these FSCs would have been designated with a direct combat probability coding (DCPC) of P1, which meant that no females could be assigned to them.

Discussion.

AR 600-13 (27 MAR 92, Army Policy for the Assignment of Female Soldiers) is the policy source document that addresses women in the Army. Federal law and this policy prohibit situations where units with female soldiers are "routinely collocated" with combat arms units. According to Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), the SECDEF says that no change to our policy is required.

BSB positions have a DCPC of P2 (open to females). Therefore, the FSCs of the BSB cannot routinely collocate with the combat arms units they support. However, ample precedent exists to suggest that under certain circumstances the FSC might be OPCON or TACON to a CAB. The justification is that we cannot deny options to the BCT commander who needs to employ his forces according to the tactical situation.

FMI 4-90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics, describes the FSC as organic to the CAB. On page 1-9 it states that, “At the lowest levels, the FSC, as the logistics provider for the HBCT's battalions and squadron, will be assigned/organic to the combined arms and fires battalions and reconnaissance squadron.” FMI 3-90.6, Heavy Brigade Combat Team, has similar language. This wording in both FMIs was based on guidance to document the C2 relationship IAW the approved modular concept, which has since evolved. These manuals will be revised by March 2007.

The divisions have defined the relationship between the FSC, the BSB, and the CAB in local policies and SOPs. The 4th ID’s 3rd Brigade, e.g., has placed its FSCs under the direct command and control of each CAB commander. Additional examples are available from the field regarding these actions.

Conclusion. The nature of the modern battlefield and combat operations make it largely impractical to suggest the FSC maintain a continuous command relationship with its parent BSB for the execution of all tactical requirements. We want to allow maneuver commanders the ability to task organize their support at the tactical level to execute effective mission command. Our future doctrine must capture the realities of the contemporary operating environment and provide flexibility in command relationships and approved force structure.

Role of the BSTB HHC's Maintenance Section

Issue: In reference to the subject line, I have discovered a discrepancy regarding maintenance support and the BTB that I was hoping you could provide assistance with. IAW FMI 3-90.61, Brigade Troops Battalion Operations, Section 2-10:

MAINTENANCE SECTION
2-10. Maintenance for the HHC, HBCT and the BTB and all its assigned and attached units is accomplished by the BTB maintenance section. This section is organic to the BTB support platoon. The section provides wheeled, tracked, and power generator maintenance and manages equipment repair parts.

However, IAW FMI 4-90.1, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics, Section 3-111:

FIELD MAINTENANCE COMPANY
3-111. The mission of the field maintenance company is to provide field level maintenance support for the HBCT. It provides recovery, automotive/armament, ground support and electronic maintenance and maintenance management to brigade base elements (HQ HBCT, BSB, and BTB). It also provides maintenance advice and support to the brigade and serves as the central entry and exit point into the brigade for low density equipment.

Question: Please provide clarification regarding this issue; does the Field Maintenance Company provide maintenance support to the BTB or does the BTB receive maintenance support solely from the Maintenance Section?

Answer:

• The maintenance section of the BSTB HHC provides field level maintenance to the HHC, the NSC, the MICO, and the BDE HQ. Certain low-density items are maintained by the BSB FMC.
• The maintenance section is not manned (see below) to provide support to attached units, who get their support from organic maintenance elements or the FMC.
  
  
  Maintenance Sect, BSTB HHC
  
  MOTOR SGT E6 63B3O
  WHEELED VEH MECH E5 63B2O
  EQUIP REC/PARTS SGT E5 92A2O
  PWR-GEN EQUIP REP E4 52D1O
  WHEELED VEH MECH E4 63B1O
  EQUIP REC/PARTS SP E4 92A1O
  WHEELED VEH MECH E3 63B1O
  BFVS MAINT E3 63M1O

Movement Control in the Division AO

In an effort to clarify how movement control (MC) will work in the modular division, I'm providing this excerpt from a recent trip report I wrote (with help from Bruce Koch, LTC(R), and Gary Beasley, CDD). What's important here is that the TRADOC community recognizes that the new, modular division needs to have a MCT (from the theater sustainment command (TSC)) present in its area of operations (AO) in order to perform MC functions.

"The MC issues lead off the discussions [at the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) on Fort Leavenworth] on 9 November. During this initial session, CADD admitted that their initial position concerning movements within the division AO was in error. The division cannot abrogate its responsibility for movements and MC within its area of operations. They also accepted the requirement for an MCT in support of the DTO. The remaining issues were to answer how MC elements would be employed within the division AO. The assembled group explored how these elements would be arrayed on the battlefield and what functions they would perform. The CASCOM team spent the remainder of the afternoon preparing a briefing that captured and presented scenarios demonstrating how divisional MC will work.

On 10 November, we presented the briefing to the CADD Director. Our restated line of reasoning met with his approval, and he instructed his staff to update draft division doctrine, FMI 3-91, and provide a revised decision paper for the CAC Commander’s signature outlining MC operations in the division AO. Key points reiterated during the briefing were:

- The division cannot abrogate to a subordinate headquarters its responsibilities with respect to MC in its area of operations.

- A modular MCT placed in support and under the supervision of the DTO fills an important capability gap in the division.

- The DTO/MCT must be placed with a C2 headquarters to gain and maintain situational awareness and information for the Common Operational Picture (COP). (e.g. TACs, BCTs, CSB(ME))

- There remains a requirement for frequent, direct coordination between the division G3 and the DTO. The DTO will be positioned at the C2 node that best allows him to complete his mission.

Naming Conventions

I received the following message the other day. It's caused some concern, because most of our new concepts haven't really accounted for the additional layer of bureaucracy known as the corps. So, in a sense the Army has come full circle. We are brigade-based, but still top heavy. I'm at a loss as to what the corps HQ will do -- except complicate our briefing charts even further.

Subject: Naming Convention for Army Modular Forces

EXSUM: Naming Convention for Army Modular Forces .

During the VCSA Army Campaign Plan Update on 22 Sep 05, General Cody announced that on 21 Sep 05 the CSA made several decisions effecting unit naming conventions. The VCSA said the terms Unit of Action (UA), Unit of Employment X (UEx) and Unit of Employment Y (UEy) will no longer be used and asked that we disseminate this information rapidly, particularly to those preparing presentations for the upcoming AUSA meeting. The UEys now all have Army designations as follows: TRMCOM is 1st Army; ARCENT is 3d Army; ARNORTH is 5th Army; ARSOUTH is 6th Army; USAREUR is 7th Army; 8th Army remains 8th Army until Korea stands down then USARPAC will become 8th Army. FORSCOM, TRADOC, AMC names will not change.

• The 3-star UExs remain as Corps ( I Corps, III Corps, and XVIII Corps).
• The 2-star UExs remain with their current designations (3d ID, 1st Cav Div, 82nd Abn, etc.)
• The Units of Action (UA) become Brigade Combat Teams (BCT).
• Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (ME) become Combat Support Brigades (ME) -- CSB(ME)
• Multi Functional Aviation Brigades (MFAB) become Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB)

Commentary: Direct Support (DS)

Direct support is “the support provided by a unit or formation not attached to, nor under command of, the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.” (FM 1-02) In the case of the brigade support battalion of a BCT, this support is organic to the BCT making the term direct support not applicable.

While this term is technically correct for UEx/UEy CSS units not assigned to a sustainment brigade or any of the other functional CSS brigades, it often implies a command and control (C2) relationship that may or may not exist. In this sense, prioritized CSS support might be better described as dedicated.

There are (currently) four accepted C2 relationships: assigned, attached, OPCON, and TACON. There are three accepted support relationships: direct, general, and area. In the case of direct support, the supporting unit has no C2 relationship with the supported unit or units. This isn't necessarily true for the units of the BSB.

The field maintenance company, distribution company, and brigade support medical company provide support to the entire brigade. Since they are organic to the brigade, their support relationship cannot be described as DS. The forward support companies of the BSB provide habitual organic support to a particular combat arms battalion to which they are not assigned.

However, depending on the situation, the FSC is either OPCON or TACON to the combat arms battalion. The commander in control considers how to use the FSC to accomplish his assigned mission, but does not provide authoritative direction for matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

Armored Supply Sergeant?

Reference: FM-I 4-90.1. Paragraph 3-190. "The maneuver unit company supply sergeants and are generally most often located in the combat battalion’s support area. They assemble their logistics packages (LOGPACs) and then move forward via their combat logistics patrol to the company logistics release point (LRP)."
Issue: This IMHO is the weak link in the supplying of units unless equipment is changed. You have a unit supply NCO moving forward with an unarmored or lightly armored truck, to support armored units. In nonlinear combat zone, this will be what the enemy is most likely to go after - I know I would if I were them. I saw nothing in the FM-I that deals with this key weakness issue. Is there recognition of this at CASCOM? A long time ago we replaced lightly armored artillery resupply vehicles with the FAASV to deal with a similar issue in the artillery area. Ditto with APCs as ambulances for the medics.
Question: Are there plans to finally deploy an armored supply vehicle to heavy unit supply sections?

I’m not aware of plans to field these supply sections with armored vehicles. A quick MTOE review of company HQs from 3ID and 10th MTN reveal that they’re still allotted the M998 (LIN T61494). The vehicle pictured below is an M1114.

However, things are looking up. Plans are in the works to create convoy security platoons (CSPs), which are supposed to operate as an internal CSS convoy force protection capability embedded in CSS convoys. A CSP will provide the capability to provide an immediate response to defeat Level I and delay Level II threats while conducting convoy operations. The CSP supports CSS convoys with crew served weapons on Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAH) as internal convoy security. When assigned, a convoy security squad or convoy security team becomes part of the convoy organization under the command of the convoy commander during the duration of the convoy mission.

SPO in the HBCT?

Reference: FM-I 4-90.1.
Issue: I was a little surprised at the location of the SPO at the HBCT level and his/her role. I would have thought the SPO would have been in the BSB instead. As listed in the first few chapters of the FM-I the BSB S2/3 has no role other then internal in dealing with logistics support to other units in the HBCT. The SPO at HBCT level appears to be the coordinator of support to units with the HBCT.
Question: Could you clarify this a bit?
The SPO is in the BSB. The SPO conducts planning with the brigade S1, S4, and surgeon. But he is not assigned to the HBCT staff.

Distribution Company, BSB diagram: ATHP

Reference: FM-I 4-90.1, Figure 3-3
Issue: Stock Control and warehouse section is missing. ATHP section is identified as ATP section in the figure.
Question: Shouldn’t the sections be horizontal under the platoon instead of vertical as is shown now?

ATHP is the correct term. The ammunition transfer/holding point has two sub-elements: a stock control team and a store & issue squad. The stock control team performs all stock control functions associated with operating the SAAS. The storage and issue squad conducts ATP operations and conducts ASA operations using assigned CMHE as the operation dictates.

Yes, the sections should be arranged vertically in the diagram. Or I think it would also be okay to leave the units where they are and remove the lines, which imply a hierarchy.

Update: QSC & General Supply Flows.

Reference: White Paper, Chapter 11, F-36
Issue: The QSC is shown in the flows for (General Supplies, CL VII, IX) and a DS Supply Company is shown the flows for (Water, Sustainment).
Question: What is the mission of the QSC vs. the DS Supply Company? Typo or intentional?
References to the “QSC” were not meant to imply any specific type of company. In the context of the White Paper, this was just a placeholder meant to refer to any company with the corresponding QM capability. The following units could, for example, fit the description depending upon your frame of reference:

QM Petroleum Support Company (10420F100 & 10420F200)
QM Water Purification & Distribution Company (10460F000)
QM Support Company (42420F000)

The term QSC refers to the QM support company, which combines DS & GS capability. In the modular Army, DS supply companies go away.